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Executive Equity Compensation and Tax Avoidance:  
The Effect of Firm Size 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Economic theory predicts a significant relationship between executive equity 
compensation incentives and corporate outcomes (e.g., Core, Guay, and Larcker 2003; Flor, 
Frimor, and Munk 2014). In line with this theory, a limited stream of research seeks to document 
a relation between executive compensation attributes and tax avoidance. Furthermore, prior 
research documents considerable differences in executive compensation incentives between larger 
and smaller firms (Cadman, Klasa, and Matsunaga 2010). In this study, we seek to bring together 
these areas of research to study the relationship between executive compensation incentives and 
tax avoidance, while focusing on the direct effect of firm size on this relationship.  
Firm size has important implications for a firm’s compensation and tax avoidance. First, 
prior studies examining compensation largely ignore small companies, given that the majority of 
these studies use the ExecuComp database which is made up of the firms within the S&P 1500 
index. Cadman, Klasa, and Matsunaga (2010) find that ExecuComp firms are larger and that their 
CEOs have higher levels of total compensation and higher proportion of equity compensation 
(restricted stock and stock options) relative to total compensation than non-ExecuComp firms. 
While prior studies that examine the relationship between equity compensation and tax avoidance 
typically control for firm size, Cadman et al. (2010) demonstrate that the differences between large 
firms and small firms relating to their differing contracting environments and are not replicable 
within a sample of only ExecuComp firms. Furthermore, other studies have shown more generally 
the importance in distinguishing large firms from smaller firms, especially in empirical research. 
Bamber, Christensen, and Gaver (2000) discuss how research design can significantly affect 
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research results, and specifically, that empirical research can present an overgeneralization of 
results found in smaller firms. Similarly, Givoly, Hayn, and Lourie (2016) argue that large samples 
used in accounting and finance empirical research may “lead to inferences that are tainted by a 
‘small-firm’ bias. This bias refers to the disproportionate weight assigned to the large number of 
small cap companies present in the examined samples.” Both of these studies illustrate the 
importance of analyzing anomalies in firms without discounting the importance of firm size.  
Second, both economic theory and the extant empirical evidence provide conflicting 
insights on the relation between equity compensation and tax avoidance. On the one hand, to the 
extent that tax avoidance minimizes cash payments to tax authorities, it enhances shareholder 
value. Agency theory therefore predicts that aligning managers’ incentives with shareholders’ 
using equity compensation should incentivize managers to engage in tax avoidance (Crocker and 
Slemrod 2005). On the other hand, tax exhaustion theory predicts as firms make use of the tax 
shield of equity compensation, their demand for additional tax avoidance declines (Seidman and 
Stomberg 2017). Hence larger firms that pay significantly more in equity compensation than 
smaller firms (both in dollar amounts and as a proportion of total compensation) should approach 
tax exhaustion sooner than smaller firms. This theory predicts a negative relation between equity 
compensation and tax avoidance, especially within large firms. We seek to contribute to this stream 
of literature by adding an additional insight using the effect of firm size on the relationship between 
compensation and tax avoidance. 
We posit that smaller firms do not have access to a robust capital market and may thus need 
to more strongly rely on an effective incentive and compensation structure. Evidence in existing 
literature supports this idea in that pay-for-performance sensitivity is decreasing in firm size 
(Schaefer 1998; Murphy 1999; and Dicks 2012). Hence, we expect executives in smaller firms to 
 3 
 
be more motivated to engage in tax avoidance than executives in larger firms. We predict that the 
association between equity compensation and tax avoidance is more positive (less positive) in 
smaller (larger) firms.   
To test our hypothesis, we examine the relation between executive equity compensation 
incentives and tax avoidance by firm size quartile using a large sample comprised of compensation 
information for executives of companies included in the S&P Capital IQ database. Our final 
sample consists of 22,804 firm-year observations with CEO and CFO compensation data over the 
period 2006 to 2017. We follow prior literature in measuring tax avoidance as the three-year cash 
effective tax rate (ETR) and three-year GAAP ETR (e.g., Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2010), as 
well as industry-adjusted measures of each. We measure equity incentives as the ratio of annual 
stock and option awards to total annual compensation (e.g., Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker 2012). 
We focus on this measure of compensation incentives for three reasons: First, it is simple and 
compared to delta and vega, can more easily be adjusted by directors to influence manager 
behavior. Second, compensation mix is commonly used by compensation consulting companies 
who heavily influence compensation structure (e.g., Conyon, Peck, and Sadler 2009). Finally, 
because the measure is readily available for more companies, we can examine a more complete 
sample of large and small firms, which is crucial for testing our hypothesis. 
 Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that CEO equity compensation incentives 
negatively relate to both Cash ETR and GAAP ETR, but only in smaller firms. Specifically, a 
significant negative association between equity compensation and tax avoidance does not exist in 
firms within the top size quartile but is prominent in the bottom three quartiles representing 75 
percent of total assets. Similarly, after controlling for financial constraints and the tax deductibility 
of equity compensation, we continue to find a negative association between CEO equity 
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compensation incentives and both Cash ETR and GAAP ETR, but only within smaller firms. Using 
the ending balance of unrecognized tax benefits or increases to this balance due to uncertain tax 
positions taken in the current year, we continue to find that only smaller companies avoid more 
taxes when they compensate their executives with equity compensation. These results suggest that 
firm size can substantially affect insights into the relation between executive compensation and 
corporate tax planning.  The results highlight size as a boundary condition that reconciles the 
seemingly conflicting agency and tax exhaustion theories with respect to tax avoidance. 
Specifically, our results are consistent with agency theory which suggests equity compensation 
aligns managers’ interests with shareholders’ fostering tax savings. The results are also consistent 
with tax exhaustion theory which suggests the marginal benefits of tax savings become smaller as 
large firms pay more equity compensation.    
The primary contribution of this study is that we extend the emerging literature exploring 
the relationship between executive incentives and tax avoidance (e.g. Armstrong, Blouin, and 
Larcker 2012; Gaertner 2014; Armstrong, Blouin, Jagolinzer, and Larcker 2015). For example, 
Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker (2012) explore variation in executive responsibility for tax 
avoidance. Relying on the knowledge that tax directors are highly responsible for tax planning, 
they use proprietary compensation data for a sample of large firms and find a negative relation 
between tax director compensation incentives and GAAP ETR, but perhaps due to the unique 
contracting environment of large firms, they do not find evidence of a relation between CEO (CFO) 
compensation incentives and either GAAP or Cash ETR.  
We extend these studies by exploring differences in the relation between executives’ equity 
compensation and tax avoidance, conditioning on firm size. Although, on average, we find no 
evidence of a relation between CEO (CFO) equity compensation and tax avoidance within large 
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firms, there is a strong positive relation between these constructs within smaller firms. These 
results suggest that the differences in contracting environment across firms that have been 
documented in prior research partially explain why some empirical tests based on a sample of large 
firms fail to corroborate economic theory. Moreover, we demonstrate that in testing the link 
between tax avoidance and equity compensation incentives, tests comparing groups within large 
firm samples and controlling for size are not substitutes for tests directly comparing large- and 
small-firm samples. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Executive Incentives, Corporate Outcomes, and Tax Avoidance 
Economic theory predicts a significant relationship between executive incentives and 
corporate outcomes. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Holmstrom (1979) helped lay the foundation 
of optimal contracting by modeling compensation contracts as solutions to the traditional agency 
problem of the firm. More specifically related to tax avoidance, Crocker and Slemrod (2005) 
provide a model of the contractual relationship between a firm’s directors and a firm’s 
shareholders, and state that it is in the shareholders’ interests to align executive incentives with the 
effective tax rate of the firm, such that the directors reduce the firm’s tax liabilities. Desai and 
Dharmapala (2006) also provide a theoretical foundation for the relationship between 
compensation and tax avoidance and explore this relationship in conjunction with managerial rent-
extraction and corporate governance. These theories predict a positive relationship between 
executive compensation and tax avoidance.       
In line with theory, a vast stream of research has attempted to empirically document the 
relationship between top executives and outcomes of the firm. A limited number of studies, 
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however, have examined the relationship between compensation and tax avoidance, without 
finding the expected relationship. Phillips (2003) is one of the first studies to examine 
compensation and tax-specific outcomes of a firm. He uses a proprietary data set to study the tax-
specific performance measures of CEOs and business unit managers and finds no relationship 
between tax performance measures for CEOs and GAAP ETR. Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 
(2010) find a general executive effect on ExecuComp firms’ effective tax rate, that is, tax 
avoidance that cannot be explained by characteristics of the firm and can be attributed to individual 
executives. However, the results of the study do not specifically attribute the effects on tax 
avoidance to the wealth sensitivity of the executives. Using proprietary data of large firms, 
Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker (2012) find a similar result that the compensation mix of 
executives of the firm (CEO, CFO, and General Counsel) does not have a significant relationship 
with GAAP or Cash ETR.  
Another group of studies do find an effect of CEO compensation on tax avoidance. Rego 
and Wilson (2012) posit that tax avoidance is a risky activity, and as such, relates to the equity risk 
incentives given to executives. In their ExecuComp sample, they find that option vega, or wealth 
sensitivity of the CEO to changes in stock return volatility, positively relates to tax avoidance using 
several different measures of tax avoidance. Armstrong, Blouin, Jagolinzer, and Larcker (2015) 
find a similar result in their sample from Equilar by looking not only at the mean tax avoidance 
but at extreme levels as well. They find that CEO equity incentives are positively related to tax 
avoidance and that the relation is stronger at higher levels of tax avoidance. Gaertner (2014) finds 
that the existence of tax performance measures in a CEOs contract is, indeed, positively related to 
tax avoidance, as measured by GAAP ETR. However, the study does not find a significant 
relationship between CEO delta or vega and tax avoidance. 
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Finally, there is a group of studies that find a negative relationship between executive 
incentives and tax avoidance. Desai and Dharmapala (2006) find results that are initially counter-
intuitive, i.e., increasing incentives for top executives actually decreases tax avoidance, as 
measured by the book-tax gap. They explain this relationship by arguing that complex tax 
sheltering provides opportunities for rent-extraction by managers. Increases in compensation 
better align managers’ interests with shareholders, thus reducing private rent-extraction by 
managers, and as a result, reducing the tax sheltering mechanisms that help obfuscate rent-
extracting activities. Similarly, Seidman and Stomberg (2017) find a negative relationship between 
equity compensation mix of top executives and tax avoidance. They attribute the relationship to 
tax exhaustion theory and show that firms substitute between tax minimization activities such that 
when a firm has significant equity compensation and takes the related tax deductions to benefit the 
firm, the firm will use less tax shelters, especially when the marginal benefit of an additional tax 
avoidance activity is low.  
 
Firm Size 
Cadman, Klasa, and Matsunaga (2010) find significant differences in the contracting 
environments between firms found in Standard & Poors’s (S&P) ExecuComp database 
(ExecuComp firms), which covers firms within the S&P 1500 indices, and firms not covered by 
the ExecuComp database (non-ExecuComp firms). They find that ExecuComp firms are larger, 
more profitable, more highly levered, have higher complexity, greater analyst following, greater 
(but less concentrated) institutional ownership, greater stock liquidity, and generally, a healthier 
financial outlook. Furthermore, executives of ExecuComp firms are found to have significantly 
greater levels of total compensation and a greater proportion of their compensation packets in the 
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form of non-cash compensation. These differences lead them to predict and show three main 
results: ExecuComp firms rely more heavily on earnings and stock returns as performance 
measures; the weight on earnings is less sensitive to a firm’s growth opportunities for non-
ExecuComp firms; and the positive relationship between institutional ownership concentration and 
stock option grants is less likely to hold in non-ExecuComp firms. Broadly, the study shows that 
differences in the contracting environment lead to differences in the design of incentive contracts, 
and as such, “expanding samples to include non-ExecuComp firms can substantially influence 
empirical results and provide researchers with additional insights into executive compensation and 
corporate governance issues (p. 1514-1515).” The systematic differences between ExecuComp 
and non-ExecuComp firms and their executive compensation structures documented in Cadman, 
Klasa, and Matsunaga (2010) and discussed above have larger implications for the effect of firm 
size on the relationship between executive compensation and tax avoidance.  
Smaller firms do not have access to a robust capital market, which can have compensation 
and tax-avoidance implications. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) study the 
determinants of cash holdings and find that cash holdings decrease significantly with firm size. 
They explain that firms with the greatest access to the capital market, such as large firms, hold less 
cash. Because small firms do not have the same access to a robust capital markets environment, 
they hold cash for internal financing purposes, which could in turn mean that less cash is available 
for executive compensation. Thus, smaller firms may need to more strongly rely on an effective 
incentive and compensation structure. Evidence in existing literature supports this idea. Research 
has shown that pay-for-performance sensitivity is decreasing in firm size. Schaefer (1998) 
develops an agency theory model to determine that pay-performance sensitivity and firm size are 
inversely related, implying that executives in smaller firms have a higher reservation utility. In his 
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review of theoretical and empirical compensation literature, Murphy (1999) also states that pay-
performance sensitivity varies monotonically and inversely with firm size. Dicks (2012) also 
develops a theoretical model that predicts and shows that while executive compensation levels 
increase in firm size, pay-for-performance sensitivity decreases in firm size. Furthermore, the size 
of a firm may also impact the tax avoidance opportunities presented to the firm. Several studies 
examine the effect of firm size on tax avoidance measures (Zimmerman 1983; Porcano 1986; Rego 
2003). While earlier studies found mixed results on the relationship, Rego 2003 provides more 
comprehensive modeling and sample selection, and concludes that there is evidence of economies 
of scale in tax planning. Together, these studies emphasize the importance of firm size in the firm’s 
equity incentive structure and tax avoidance strategies, and as such, in the relationship between 
the two. 
More generally, studies have shown biases can exist in empirical studies due to size effects 
of sample firms. Bamber, Christensen, and Gaver (2000) analyze two design choices made in 
empirical research, one of which is the sample selection criteria. Specifically, the authors highlight 
that results in seminal work by Beaver (1968) were based on a set of relatively small firms, and 
that those results are often overgeneralized in subsequent research. Similarly, Givoly, Hayn, and 
Lourie (2016) stress the importance of considering firm size in the weighting of sample firms when 
analyzing market anomalies, such that “small-firm bias” is avoided. They argue that the bias results 
from a “disproportionate weight assigned to the large number of small cap companies present in 
the examined samples relative to their market capitalization.”  
While some may argue that the studies discussed above promote or encourage the exclusion 
of small firms in empirical studies, we argue that the studies support our examination of the direct 
effect of size on the relationship between compensation and tax avoidance and highlight the 
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importance of examining the relationship between equity compensation and tax avoidance for 
large and small firms separately. We expect pay-for-performance sensitivity to be higher in smaller 
firms, and thus, we expect executives in these firms to be more motivated to engage in more tax 
avoidance than executives in larger firms.  
Other firm attributes, such as profitability, liquidity, and total levels of executive 
compensation also play a role in our expectation of the relationship between equity compensation 
and tax avoidance. Edwards, Schwab, and Shevlin (2015) examine the relationship between 
financial constraints and tax planning activities. They find that firms facing increases in financial 
constraints, specifically firms with low cash reserves, exhibit declines in their effective tax rates, 
indicating more tax planning in these firms. As discussed above, smaller, non-Execucomp firms 
tend to be less profitable, more financially constrained, and have lower stock liquidity than 
ExecuComp firms, indicating that smaller firms may rely more-strongly on tax planning activities.  
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) explore the relationship between managerial incentives and 
tax avoidance, and while they focus on managerial rent extraction being the cause of the negative 
relationship between incentives and tax avoidance, they do not dismiss the possibility that the 
results may be due to tax-exhaustion theory. Later, Seidman and Stomberg (2017) find a similar 
result in the relationship between managerial incentives and tax avoidance but attribute their 
findings to tax exhaustion theory and the marginal benefit of tax avoidance. They argue that firms 
have a variety of tax-shield options, one of which is the tax benefits provided by equity 
compensation (equity compensation deductions) and that the tax benefits related to having more 
equity compensation will reduce a firm’s demand for additional tax avoidance. Their results imply 
that firms with more total equity compensation, such as larger firms, are less likely to engage in 
other tax avoidance activities.  
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All together, the studies above provide insight into why prior research on the relationship 
between executive equity compensation and tax avoidance may be mixed. Because smaller firms 
have higher pay-performance sensitivity, are generally less profitable, more financially 
constrained, and have less total compensation, we posit that the relationship between equity 
compensation and tax avoidance is stronger in smaller firms than in larger firms. Formally stated, 
our hypothesis is as follows:  
Hypothesis:  The association between equity compensation and tax avoidance is more 
positive (less positive) in smaller (larger) firms.   
 
III. SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Sample selection 
We obtain compensation data from the S&P Capital IQ (CIQ) Compensation database. CIQ 
is more comprehensive than Compustat’s ExecuComp database, which is widely used in 
compensation empirical research and covers only the S&P 1500. The CIQ universe of firms not 
only includes public firms, but also private companies and other non-standard types of firms, such 
as unions and educational institutions, from all major markets. The sample provides us with a much 
broader range of firms, where we may better understand the relationship between equity 
compensation and tax avoidance based on firm size.  
We match fiscal year t equity compensation incentives to tax avoidance measures 
computed over fiscal years t through fiscal year t+1. We obtain data to compute the tax outcome 
avoidance and control variables from the Compustat database. In line with prior literature, we 
delete financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) in order to 
eliminate the effect of regulatory and institutional differences between these firms and other firms. 
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Our final sample consists of 22,804 firm-year observations for firms with CEO compensation data 
over the period 2006 to 2017. The sample for our tests of CFO compensation incentives consists 
of 16,708 firm-year observations.  
 
Research design 
We predict a more positive relationship between tax avoidance and executive equity 
compensation incentives for smaller firms relative to larger firms. To test this prediction, we 
estimate the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model at the firm-year level by size 
quartile:  
 
     TaxAvoidancei,t = α0 + α1EQUITYi,t + βnControlsn,i,t + i,t   (1) 
 
In our main tests, we measure firm size by the natural log of assets1. Consistent with prior 
literature (e.g., Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2010), we use two proxies to measure tax avoidance. 
The first proxy, Cash ETR (CASHETR3) is the sum of cash taxes paid (TXPD) for year t through 
year t+1, divided by the sum of adjusted pre-tax income (PI-SPI) over the same period. The second 
proxy, GAAP ETR (GAAPETR3) is the sum of total tax expense (TXT) for year t through year 
t+1, divided by the sum of adjusted pre-tax income over the same period.2 Consistent with prior 
literature (e.g., Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker 2012; Seidman and Stomberg 2017), equity 
compensation incentives (EQUITY) is the ratio of annual stock and option awards to total annual 
compensation for the CEO. We focus on this measure of compensation incentives for three reasons: 
                                                             
1 In untabulated results, we also measure size as market value, finding similar inferences. 
2 Consistent with prior literature, we require each firm to have positive adjusted pre-tax income in each of the three 
years over which we compute the tax avoidance measures.  We also censor that ETR measures to be between 0 and 1.  
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First, given its simplicity, this measure can more easily be manipulated by directors to influence 
manager behavior than, for example, calculating risk in order to manipulate delta and vega. Second, 
compensation mix is commonly used by compensation consulting companies, which influence 
how directors set compensation levels (e.g., Conyon, Peck, and Sadler 2009). Finally, from a 
research design perspective, this measure is more readily available for more companies. 
The control variables consist of tax avoidance determinants as well as other variables that 
might affect equity compensation incentives. Specifically, we control for firm leverage (LEV), firm 
size (LOGASSET), market-to-book (MTB), capital intensity (CAPINT), investments in inventory 
(INV), advertising expense (AD), research & development expense (RD), pre-tax return on assets 
(PROA), intangibles (INTAN), equity in subsidiaries (EQINC), net operating loss carried forward 
(NOL), audit quality (BIG4), foreign operations (FORINCD), cash held (CASH). Furthermore, we 
control for other tax benefits of compensation to account for prior research that has found that 
firms may exhaust all opportunities to avoid taxes because of their larger equity compensation 
payments, thus leaving fewer opportunities or incentives for their managers to save additional 
taxes (Seidman and Stomberg 2017). We control for stock compensation expense and cash tax 
benefit of stock options using stock compensation expense (STCKEXP) and excess tax benefit of 
stock options (OPTBEN). We also control for year and industry fixed effects. See Appendix A for 
variable measurements. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the industry distribution of our full sample. Generally, our sample reflects 
similar industry patterns as do other, more commonly used databases. Table 2 presents descriptive 
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statistics for our sample. Table 3 shows the mean and median of our main variables of interest by 
firm size quartile, with quartile 1 being the smallest firms and quartile 4 being the largest firms. 
Based on Table 3, we see that CASHETR3, CASHETR3_ADJ, GAAPETR3, and GAAPETR3_ADJ 
all increase with firm size, that is, smaller firms have lower tax avoidance (higher ETR). Consistent 
with prior research, we also see that equity compensation increases with larger firms. 
  
Executive Equity Compensation and Tax Avoidance 
Our hypothesis predicts a stronger positive relation between executive equity compensation 
and tax avoidance within smaller firms relative to larger firms. Table 4, Panel A presents OLS 
regression results for the association between tax avoidance (CASHETR) and CEO equity 
compensation incentives (EQUITY). We run regressions within our size quartiles, split by log of 
assets. We see the coefficient on EQUITY is significantly negative only within the bottom three 
size quartiles. The significant relationship between equity compensation and tax avoidance goes 
away in the largest firm quartile (column 4). Panel B shows results for the same regression analysis, 
using industry adjusted Cash ETR as the tax avoidance measure. Here again we see that in the 
bottom two size quartiles (columns 1 and 2), we see the significant relationship between 
compensation and tax avoidance. In the third size quartile, this relationship goes away, and in the 
fourth column, the relationship actually flips, showing us a significant negative relationship 
between equity compensation and tax avoidance (higher ETR). Panels C and D mirror Panels A 
and B, but use GAAP ETR and industry-adjusted GAAP ETR, respectively, as the measure of tax 
avoidance. The results in these panels are consistent with Panels A and B. Panel D also shows the 
reversal of the relationship between equity incentives and tax avoidance in larger firms. Overall, 
consistent with our hypothesis, the positive relation between CEO equity compensation incentives 
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and tax avoidance is stronger within smaller firms, and goes away or becomes negative in larger 
firms. The reversal of results for the largest firms is consistent with tax exhaustion theory in that 
opportunities and incentives for tax avoidance declines as equity compensation increases for these 
firms with large equity compensation tax shield (Seidman and Stomberg 2017). 
In Table 5, we explore whether any particular piece of equity incentives drives our main 
result. We split up our independent variable of interest into STOCK and OPTIONS. Panel A uses 
industry-adjusted Cash ETR as the dependent variable, while Panel B uses industry-adjusted 
GAAP ETR. In Panel A, we see that the positive relationship between stock incentives and tax 
avoidance only exists in the smallest firm quartile. For stock options, we see the same result in the 
bottom two size quartiles. Furthermore, with options, we see the same result as in Table 4, that the 
positive relationship flips, such that the relationship between options and tax avoidance is negative 
in the largest size quartile. Panel B results mirror those in Panel A. Table 5 tells us that both stock 
and options affect the relationship between equity incentives and tax avoidance, but that the flip 
in the direction of the relationship happens only with stock options, which indicate that options are 
the primary driver of our main results. We find the same result for the unadjusted measures of 
Cash ETR and GAAP ETR (untabulated). 
Overall, our results imply that equity compensation motivates tax avoidance but this 
incentive effect depends on the size of the firm. For the largest of firms, equity compensation no 
longer encourages tax avoidance. The results are both in line with agency theory and tax exhaustion 
theory and highlight a clear boundary condition that reconciles these seemingly conflicting 
theories. Specifically, our results are consistent with agency theory which suggests equity 
compensation aligns managers’ interests with shareholders’ yielding tax savings. The results are 
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also consistent with tax exhaustion theory which suggests the marginal benefits of tax savings 
become smaller as large firms pay more equity compensation.    
 
Additional Analyses and Robustness Tests 
CEO and CFO Compensation 
Our main test examines CEO compensation. The CFO of a firm also has incentives and 
opportunities to influence corporate tax planning and thus, we also examine the effect of CFO 
equity compensation. Table 6 shows our main results from Table 4, but adds the variable of 
interest, EQUITY_CFO, which is the same equity measure as above, but for the CFO. Panel A uses 
industry-adjusted Cash ETR as our dependent variable. We see in this panel that there are no 
significant coefficients for the CFO’s equity incentives, and that our main results hold for the 
CEO’s equity incentives (positive relationship between equity incentives and tax avoidance in 
smaller firms, and a negative relationship in larger firms). Using industry-adjusted GAAP ETR in 
Panel B, we see the same general result, but see no significant coefficient in the largest size 
quartile. We find consistent results for the unadjusted measures of Cash ETR and GAAP ETR 
(untabulated). This result emphasizes the CEOs primary role in influencing firm outcomes and 
specifically tax avoidance strategies. 
Controlling for Highest Paid Executive, Total Wealth, and Other Variable Pay 
 To further ensure that the CEO’s equity incentives influence tax avoidance, in subsequent 
tests, we examine the equity incentives of the highest paid executive. While it is true that the CEO 
is often the highest paid executive of a firm, there are instances in which this is not the case. In 
such instances, one may argue that the CEO does not have the same incentives to influence a firm’s 
outcomes as when he or she is the highest paid individual. One may also argue that the highest 
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paid executive should be more concerned about generating tax savings.  In Table 7, we present our 
main regression analysis but include the equity incentives for the highest paid executive 
(EQUITY_TOP). In both Panels A and B (adjusted Cash ETR and adjusted GAAP ETR, 
respectively) we see that our main results hold for our CEO Equity variable of interest but find no 
consistent results for the highest paid executive. The results suggest the executives’ equity 
compensation association with tax avoidance is driven by the CEO and not by any top executive, 
highest paid executive, or the CFO. 
Prior literature shows that total wealth of a CEO affects their wealth sensitivity. That is, a 
wealthier CEO will have a lower marginal value of wealth. Therefore, it may be the case that total 
wealth affects how strongly a CEO is incentivized by his or her annual equity incentives. In 
untabulated tests, we include total wealth of a CEO (TOT_EQ_VAL) in our main regression, which 
we measure following prior literature as the total value of a CEOs stock and options portfolio, and 
find that our results hold. Using our adjusted Cash ETR measure as the dependent variable, we 
find a negative and significant coefficient on EQUITY in the smallest firm quartile (-0.038, t-stat 
of -1.764) and a positive significant coefficient in the largest quartile (0.034, t-stat 3.002). With 
GAAP ETR as our dependent variable, we find a negative and significant coefficient on EQUITY 
in the smaller two quartiles (-0.066, t-stat -2.352 in the smallest; -0.040, t-stat -2.982 in the second 
smallest), and again, a positive and significant coefficient in the largest quartile (0.034, t-stat 
2.933). We find consistent results using the unadjusted measures of Cash and GAAP ETR. 
In our main tests, we examine the effects of equity compensation on tax avoidance for 
different sized firms. One may argue that this relation applies to a pay that is contingent on 
performance. In additional tests, we also examine whether other performance-contingent pay, 
namely bonuses, relate to tax avoidance in a similar manner as does equity compensation. In 
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untabulated tests, we add a CEO’s bonus amount (BONUS) to our main regression analysis as a 
control variable. Our main results do not change. More importantly, we do not find a significant 
positive relation between the CEO’s bonus and tax avoidance. The results might relate to the idea 
that cash bonuses represent an ex-post settlement based on prior years’ performance whereas the 
value of equity compensation improves with better current and future performance.    
Other Tax Avoidance Proxies 
 In our final set of robustness tests, we examine whether our result holds using a different 
proxy for tax avoidance, Unrecognized Tax Benefits (UTB). Our first UTB measure is the ending 
balance in a firm’s UTB (UTBENDS) scaled by total assets. Table 8 Panel A shows results for this 
regression, which are consistent with our ETR results (UTB increases with tax avoidance). We see 
that the coefficient for EQUITY is positive and significant in the three smallest firm quartiles, but 
the sign flips and is not significant in the largest quartile. In Panel B, we use additions to UTB 
(UTBADDS) for the year scaled by total assets and see the same results, i.e., a significant 
relationship between equity incentives and tax avoidance, but only in the smaller firm quartiles 
and not in the largest quartile. Hence our main results using both adjusted and unadjusted cash and 
GAAP ETR are robust to measuring tax avoidance using uncertain tax benefits. 
  
V. CONCLUSION 
Economic theory predicts that aligning managerial and shareholder incentives through 
stock compensation creates value for the firm, and that tax avoidance is generally value-adding. 
Overall, and indeed consistent with the recommendation in Cadman, Klasa, and Matsunaga (2010), 
by using a broader sample that includes firms of all sizes, we document substantially different 
insights into the relation between executive compensation and corporate tax planning. We see our 
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results as complementary to prior research that may be perceived as having “mixed” results when 
examining this relationship.   
Recent literature has shown significant contracting environment differences between firms 
found in the ExecuComp database and firms not in that database (Cadman, Klasa, and Matsunaga 
2010), such as firm size, firm profitability, firm liquidity, pay-for-performance sensitivity, and 
total equity compensation. Cadman, Klasa, and Matsunaga (2010) stress that expanding samples 
to include non-ExecuComp firms can significantly influence empirical results. Further, other 
studies stress the importance of taking into account the sample and specifically firm size when 
interpreting empirical results (Bamber, Christensen, Gaver 2000; Givoly, Hayn, Lourie 2016).  
We attempt to do just that by exploring the compensation and tax avoidance relationship 
for a broad sample of firms of a larger size variation than most previous studies. Most of the studies 
referenced above use ExecuComp or proprietary data of firms very similar to ExecuComp firms. 
Given that larger firms have lower pay-for-performance sensitivity, are generally more profitable 
and more liquid, and have more total and equity compensation, we predict and find that the 
relationship between executive equity compensation and tax avoidance is less important in these 
firms, if significant at all and that it is smaller firms where we are more likely to see the positive 
relationship between managerial equity incentives and tax avoidance.   
Our study contributes broadly to the existing literature that explores the relationship 
between executive compensation and corporate outcomes. Specifically, we add to the more limited 
research that examines executive compensation and its effect on tax avoidance. We show that 
sample selection, and specifically firm size, contributes to this relationship. We provide the novel 
insight that size is a boundary condition that reconciles the seemingly conflicting agency and tax 
exhaustion theories with respect to tax avoidance. Our study also contributes to the literature in 
 20 
 
that it demonstrates the importance of data source in empirical compensation research given that 
most prior studies use the ExecuComp database or proprietary datasets with large companies very 
similar to those in the ExecuComp database.  
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Appendix A 
Main Variable Definitions 
Dependent Variables  
CASHETR3 = The sum of cash taxes paid (TXPD) for year t through year t+2, divided 
by the sum of adjusted pre-tax income (PI-SPI) for year t through year 
t+2. 
GAAPETR3 = The sum of tax expense (TXT) for year t through year t+2, divided by 
the sum of adjusted pre-tax income (PI-SPI) for year t through year t+2. 
CASHETR3_ADJ = Industry-adjusted CASHETR3 
GAAPETR3_ADJ 
UTBENDS 
 
UTBADDS 
= Industry-adjusted GAAPETR3 
= Ending unrecognized tax benefits (TXTUBEND) divided by total assets 
(AT) in year t multiplied by 100. 
=Additions to unrecognized tax benefits for the current year’s uncertain 
tax positions (TXTUBPOSINC) divided by total assets (AT) for year t 
multiplied by 100. 
Independent Variable  
EQUITY 
 
STOCK 
 
OPTIONS 
EQUITY_CFO 
 
EQUITY_TOP 
 
TOT_EQ_VAL 
= The ratio of annual stock and options awards to total annual compensation 
for the CEO. 
= The ratio of annual stock awards to total annual compensation for the 
CEO. 
= The ratio of annual options to total annual compensation for the CEO. 
= The ratio of annual stock and options awards to total annual compensation 
for the CFO. 
= The ratio of annual stock and options awards to total annual compensation 
for the highest paid executive. 
=The ratio of the total value of stock and options portfolio to total annual 
compensation for the CEO. 
  
Control Variables  
LEV = Long-term debt (DLTT) divided by total assets (AT) in year t. 
MTB = Market value of equity (CSHO * PRCC_F) divided by book value of 
equity (CEQ) in year t. 
CAPINT = Gross property, plant, and equipment (PPEGT) divided by lagged total 
assets in year t. 
INV = Inventory (INVT) divided by lagged total assets in year t. 
AD = Advertising expense (XAD) divided by lagged total assets in year t. 
RD = Research and development expense (XRD) divided by lagged total assets 
in year t. 
PROA = Pre-tax return income (PI) divided by total assets (AT) in year t. 
INTAN = Intangible assets (INTAN) divided by lagged total assets in year t. 
EQINC = Equity in subsidiaries (ESUB) divided by lagged total assets in year t. 
NOL =1 (0 otherwise) if tax loss carry forward (TLCF) is negative at the 
beginning of year t. 
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Appendix A, continued 
Main Variable Definitions 
  
BIG4 =1 (0 otherwise) if the company is audited by a top four accounting firm 
in year t. 
FORINCD =1 (0 otherwise) if foreign pre-tax income (PIFO) is non-missing in year t. 
CASH = Cash (CHE) divided by total assets (AT) in year t. 
STCKEXP = Stock compensation expense (STKCO) divided by pre-tax income (PI) 
in year t. 
OPTBEN = Excess tax benefit of stock options (TXBCOF) divided by pre-tax 
income (PI) in year t. 
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Table 1 
Industry Distribution of Observations 
 Description       Observations 
 Communication Services       1,418 
 Consumer Discretionary       4,021 
 Consumer Staples       1,296 
 Energy       2,071 
 Health Care       3,156 
 Industrials       4,420 
 Information Technology       4,971 
 Materials       1,451 
 Total       22,804 
                  The table presents the distribution of firm-years observations by industry.  
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables 
Variables N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75 Max 
CASHETR3 22,804 0.20 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.30 1.00 
CASHETR3_ADJ 22,804 0.02 0.21 -0.42 -0.13 -0.01 0.11 0.96 
GAAPETR3 22,804 0.22 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.34 1.00 
GAAPETR3_AD
J 
22,804 0.01 0.22 -0.63 -0.17 0.00 0.11 0.96 
EQUITY 22,804 0.39 0.28 0.00 0.13 0.42 0.61 1.00 
STOCK 22,804 0.24 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.41 0.99 
OPTIONS 22,804 0.15 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.25 0.92 
LEV 22,804 0.21 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.33 1.36 
MTB 22,804 4.54 14.3 -37.84 0.00 1.37 4.71 106.22 
CAPINT 22,804 0.53 0.51 0.00 0.17 0.38 0.76 3.86 
INV 22,804 0.12 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.17 0.77 
AD 22,804 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.16 
RD 22,804 0.06 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 1.21 
PROA 22,804 -0.05 1.11 -23.09 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.44 
INTAN 22,804 0.24 0.28 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.38 1.56 
EQINC 22,804 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 
NOL 22,804 0.66 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
BIG4 22,804 0.72 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
FORINCD 22,804 0.60 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
CASH 22,804 0.17 0.19 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.25 0.99 
STKEXP 22,804 0.06 0.34 -1.05 0.00 0.05 0.13 1.03 
OPTBEN 22,804 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for firm-year observations. The sample period is from 2006 
to 2017 for observations that have S&P Capital IQ data to compute CASHETR3 and GAAPETR3. 
Dependent variables, independent variables, and control variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 3 
Variables of Interest by Size Quartile 
 Size Qrt 1 Size Qrt 2 Size Qrt 3 Size Qrt 4 
Variables Mean Mdn Mean Mdn Mean Mdn Mean Mdn 
CASHETR3 0.10 0.00 0.19 0.14 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.21 
CASHETR3_ADJ -0.07 -0.14 0.01 -0.04 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.03 
GAAPETR3 0.12 0.00 0.22 0.20 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.24 
GAAPETR3_ADJ -0.07 -0.17 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
EQUITY 0.17 0.05 0.33 0.31 0.43 0.46 0.51 0.55 
STOCK 0.06 0.00 0.16 0.01 0.28 0.25 0.34 0.34 
OPTIONS 0.12 0.00 0.16 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.17 0.13 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for our main variables of interest by size quartile. Size is 
measured by log of total assets, with quartile 1 being the smallest firms and quartile 4 being the 
largest firms. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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Table 4 
Tax Avoidance and CEO Equity Compensation Incentives by Size Quartile 
 
Panel A: TAXAVOID = CASHETR3 
Variables Size Qrt 1  Size Qrt 2  Size Qrt 3  Size Qrt 4 
             
EQUITY -0.037***  -0.028***  -0.016*  0.016 
 (-2.649)  (-2.765)  (-1.704)  (1.530) 
LEV -0.007  -0.033**  -0.103***  -0.115*** 
 (-0.480)  (-2.546)  (-9.630)  (-8.840) 
MTB 0.000  -0.000  -0.000**  -0.000** 
 (1.473)  (-1.481)  (-2.255)  (-2.167) 
CAPINT 0.002  -0.035***  -0.037***  -0.045*** 
 (0.418)  (-5.667)  (-6.464)  (-7.993) 
INV 0.076***  0.041**  0.075***  0.098*** 
 (3.765)  (2.228)  (3.915)  (4.943) 
AD -0.027  0.208***  0.463***  0.070 
 (-0.272)  (2.688)  (5.521)  (0.630) 
RD -0.063***  -0.204***  -0.304***  -0.348*** 
 (-4.355)  (-8.631)  (-6.648)  (-6.237) 
PROA 0.001  0.176***  0.109***  0.032 
 (1.155)  (11.952)  (5.839)  (1.233) 
INTAN 0.022*  0.016  0.026**  0.055*** 
 (1.702)  (1.337)  (2.394)  (5.884) 
EQINC 0.024  -0.381***  -0.270***  -0.254*** 
 (0.201)  (-3.877)  (-3.367)  (-3.998) 
NOL -0.170***  -0.076***  -0.033***  -0.020*** 
 (-20.726)  (-12.690)  (-6.269)  (-4.153) 
BIG4 0.021*  0.018***  0.030***  -0.010 
 (1.731)  (3.244)  (4.171)  (-0.763) 
FORINCD 0.029***  0.033***  0.053***  0.029*** 
 (3.308)  (6.013)  (9.652)  (5.086) 
CASH -0.003  -0.036**  -0.013  -0.028 
 (-0.176)  (-2.149)  (-0.586)  (-1.144) 
STCKEXP 0.055***  0.028***  0.002  -0.027*** 
 (5.751)  (4.326)  (0.265)  (-2.845) 
OPTBEN -5.601***  -1.132***  -0.734***  -0.306 
 (-5.848)  (-4.032)  (-3.176)  (-1.185) 
Constant 0.222***  0.256***  0.218***  0.264*** 
 (20.823)  (25.015)  (17.971)  (16.472) 
        
N   2,714 
 
 6,518 
 
 6,902 
 
 6,670 
 Yr. & Ind. FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.21  0.14  0.09  0.06 
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Table 4 
 
Panel B: TAXAVOID = CASHETR3_ADJ 
Variables Size Qrt 1  Size Qrt 2  Size Qrt 3  Size Qrt 4 
             
EQUITY -0.044***  -0.019*  -0.003  0.033*** 
 (-3.054)  (-1.896)  (-0.296)  (3.237) 
LEV -0.006  -0.009  -0.072***  -0.089*** 
 (-0.398)  (-0.716)  (-6.817)  (-6.893) 
MTB 0.000*  -0.000  -0.001***  -0.000* 
 (1.906)  (-1.389)  (-3.308)  (-1.710) 
CAPINT 0.009  -0.018***  -0.015***  -0.017*** 
 (1.524)  (-2.989)  (-2.599)  (-3.068) 
INV 0.038*  -0.020  -0.023  -0.047** 
 (1.860)  (-1.087)  (-1.223)  (-2.392) 
AD -0.031  0.024  0.272***  -0.205* 
 (-0.310)  (0.309)  (3.295)  (-1.875) 
RD -0.059***  -0.161***  -0.168***  -0.191*** 
 (-4.000)  (-6.884)  (-3.723)  (-3.476) 
PROA 0.001  0.160***  0.086***  0.004 
 (0.899)  (10.950)  (4.674)  (0.170) 
INTAN 0.020  0.022*  0.021**  0.046*** 
 (1.491)  (1.850)  (2.038)  (4.978) 
EQINC 0.098  -0.262***  -0.125  -0.084 
 (0.819)  (-2.680)  (-1.584)  (-1.340) 
NOL -0.165***  -0.066***  -0.027***  -0.018*** 
 (-19.743)  (-11.169)  (-5.181)  (-3.643) 
BIG4 0.015  0.003  0.020***  -0.010 
 (1.260)  (0.578)  (2.860)  (-0.746) 
FORINCD 0.023***  0.037***  0.050***  0.021*** 
 (2.596)  (6.905)  (9.202)  (3.598) 
CASH 0.019  -0.009  0.001  -0.036 
 (1.180)  (-0.575)  (0.055)  (-1.480) 
STCKEXP 0.055***  0.028***  0.009  -0.024** 
 (5.593)  (4.278)  (1.197)  (-2.570) 
OPTBEN -5.387***  -0.921***  -0.601***  -0.104 
 (-5.528)  (-3.297)  (-2.637)  (-0.406) 
Constant 0.052***  0.060***  0.025**  0.077*** 
 (4.810)  (5.935)  (2.119)  (4.861) 
        
N   2,714 
 
 6,518 
 
 6,902 
 
 6,670 
 Yr. & Ind. FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.19  0.10  0.05  0.02 
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Table 4 
 
Panel C: TAXAVOID = GAAPETR3 
Variables Size Qrt 1  Size Qrt 2  Size Qrt 3  Size Qrt 4 
             
EQUITY -0.050***  -0.037***  -0.029***  0.012 
 (-2.981)  (-3.303)  (-2.801)  (1.195) 
LEV -0.016  -0.025*  -0.057***  -0.026** 
 (-1.004)  (-1.722)  (-4.911)  (-1.985) 
MTB 0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.000 
 (1.440)  (1.307)  (-1.175)  (0.861) 
CAPINT 0.010  -0.027***  -0.024***  -0.029*** 
 (1.494)  (-3.917)  (-3.860)  (-5.060) 
INV -0.001  -0.036*  0.015  0.047** 
 (-0.061)  (-1.745)  (0.720)  (2.338) 
AD -0.066  0.254***  0.181**  -0.130 
 (-0.557)  (2.963)  (1.982)  (-1.155) 
RD -0.072***  -0.216***  -0.273***  -0.480*** 
 (-4.162)  (-8.260)  (-5.482)  (-8.488) 
PROA 0.004***  0.222***  0.197***  0.251*** 
 (2.747)  (13.665)  (9.719)  (9.659) 
INTAN -0.043***  -0.029**  -0.018  -0.022** 
 (-2.774)  (-2.130)  (-1.557)  (-2.300) 
EQINC -0.036  -0.174  -0.442***  -0.420*** 
 (-0.262)  (-1.600)  (-5.059)  (-6.523) 
NOL -0.137***  -0.035***  0.001  0.004 
 (-14.049)  (-5.329)  (0.218)  (0.857) 
BIG4 -0.008  0.013**  0.017**  0.011 
 (-0.557)  (2.133)  (2.125)  (0.793) 
FORINCD -0.005  0.018***  0.027***  -0.007 
 (-0.433)  (2.949)  (4.439)  (-1.271) 
CASH -0.075***  -0.094***  -0.043*  0.048* 
 (-3.942)  (-5.117)  (-1.858)  (1.900) 
STCKEXP 0.053***  0.025***  0.005  -0.009 
 (4.619)  (3.520)  (0.632)  (-0.963) 
OPTBEN -3.222***  -1.843***  -1.412***  -0.427 
 (-2.842)  (-5.928)  (-5.606)  (-1.632) 
Constant 0.276***  0.288***  0.257***  0.241*** 
 (21.926)  (25.440)  (19.475)  (14.856) 
        
N   2,714 
 
 6,518 
 
 6,902 
 
 6,670 
 Yr. & Ind. FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.14  0.11  0.05  0.05 
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Table 4 
 
Panel D: TAXAVOID = GAAPETR3_ADJ 
Variables Size Qrt 1  Size Qrt 2  Size Qrt 3  Size Qrt 4 
             
EQUITY -0.057***  -0.029***  -0.019*  0.028*** 
 (-3.345)  (-2.607)  (-1.920)  (2.697) 
LEV -0.017  -0.003  -0.038***  -0.013 
 (-1.030)  (-0.215)  (-3.353)  (-0.986) 
MTB 0.000  0.000  -0.000**  0.000 
 (1.507)  (1.385)  (-2.051)  (1.017) 
CAPINT 0.008  -0.023***  -0.016**  -0.016*** 
 (1.133)  (-3.396)  (-2.550)  (-2.819) 
INV -0.003  -0.049**  -0.028  -0.026 
 (-0.103)  (-2.406)  (-1.366)  (-1.322) 
AD -0.077  0.104  0.084  -0.302*** 
 (-0.643)  (1.221)  (0.932)  (-2.720) 
RD -0.056***  -0.164***  -0.116**  -0.288*** 
 (-3.211)  (-6.334)  (-2.377)  (-5.158) 
PROA 0.004**  0.212***  0.172***  0.238*** 
 (2.506)  (13.146)  (8.619)  (9.262) 
INTAN -0.041***  -0.027**  -0.019*  -0.011 
 (-2.610)  (-2.009)  (-1.676)  (-1.135) 
EQINC -0.002  -0.112  -0.333***  -0.360*** 
 (-0.011)  (-1.044)  (-3.879)  (-5.658) 
NOL -0.136***  -0.031***  0.002  0.006 
 (-13.691)  (-4.726)  (0.363)  (1.250) 
BIG4 -0.012  0.001  0.010  0.008 
 (-0.827)  (0.124)  (1.286)  (0.610) 
FORINCD -0.006  0.027***  0.035***  -0.000 
 (-0.585)  (4.502)  (5.927)  (-0.062) 
CASH -0.046**  -0.057***  -0.020  0.070*** 
 (-2.382)  (-3.147)  (-0.870)  (2.816) 
STCKEXP 0.051***  0.023***  0.009  -0.007 
 (4.413)  (3.176)  (1.090)  (-0.751) 
OPTBEN -2.513**  -1.742***  -1.323***  -0.255 
 (-2.180)  (-5.657)  (-5.341)  (-0.985) 
Constant 0.072***  0.060***  0.026**  0.001 
 (5.579)  (5.344)  (1.994)  (0.077) 
        
N   2,714 
 
 6,518 
 
 6,902 
 
 6,670 
 Yr. & Ind. FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.12  0.09  0.04  0.03 
This table presents results from estimating model (1) using 22,804 firm-year observations from 
2006 to 2017, by size quartile, with quartile 1 being the smallest size, and quartile 4 being the 
largest. Panels A through D depict CASHETR3, CASHETR3_ADJ, GAAPETR3, and 
GAAPETR3_ADJ as the dependent variable, respectively. For each independent variable, 
estimated coefficients are presented in the top row and the two-sided t-statistics are in the bottom 
row. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. ***, **, and * indicate significance (two-tailed) 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Tax Avoidance and CEO Stock and Option Compensation Incentives by Size Quartile  
 
Panel A: TAXAVOID = CASHETR3_ADJ 
Variables Size Qrt 1  Size Qrt 2  Size Qrt 3  Size Qrt 4 
             
STOCK -0.053**  -0.017  -0.004  0.015 
 (-2.392)  (-1.344)  (-0.426)  (1.398) 
OPTIONS -0.039**  -0.023*  0.001  0.076*** 
 (-2.248)  (-1.798)  (0.060)  (5.536) 
LEV -0.006  -0.009  -0.072***  -0.089*** 
 (-0.418)  (-0.717)  (-6.824)  (-6.920) 
MTB 0.000*  -0.000  -0.001***  -0.000* 
 (1.903)  (-1.396)  (-3.322)  (-1.799) 
CAPINT 0.009  -0.018***  -0.015***  -0.015*** 
 (1.491)  (-2.999)  (-2.577)  (-2.769) 
INV 0.038*  -0.020  -0.023  -0.047** 
 (1.826)  (-1.079)  (-1.227)  (-2.392) 
AD -0.030  0.024  0.271***  -0.252** 
 (-0.300)  (0.313)  (3.271)  (-2.295) 
RD -0.060***  -0.160***  -0.169***  -0.211*** 
 (-4.042)  (-6.811)  (-3.741)  (-3.821) 
PROA 0.001  0.159***  0.086***  -0.001 
 (0.864)  (10.875)  (4.670)  (-0.021) 
INTAN 0.020  0.023*  0.021**  0.044*** 
 (1.475)  (1.855)  (2.018)  (4.816) 
EQINC 0.100  -0.262***  -0.125  -0.074 
 (0.833)  (-2.681)  (-1.578)  (-1.182) 
NOL -0.165***  -0.066***  -0.027***  -0.017*** 
 (-19.747)  (-11.157)  (-5.163)  (-3.569) 
BIG4 0.015  0.003  0.020***  -0.012 
 (1.234)  (0.583)  (2.841)  (-0.925) 
FORINCD 0.023***  0.037***  0.050***  0.020*** 
 (2.595)  (6.880)  (9.202)  (3.427) 
CASH 0.019  -0.009  0.001  -0.031 
 (1.168)  (-0.528)  (0.033)  (-1.280) 
STCKEXP 0.055***  0.028***  0.009  -0.023** 
 (5.593)  (4.289)  (1.214)  (-2.515) 
OPTBEN -5.395***  -0.924***  -0.592***  -0.057 
 (-5.535)  (-3.308)  (-2.587)  (-0.225) 
Constant 0.052***  0.060***  0.025**  0.079*** 
 (4.833)  (5.930)  (2.132)  (4.979) 
        
N   2,714 
 
 6,518 
 
 6,902 
 
 6,670 
 Yr. & Ind. FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.19  0.10  0.05  0.03 
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Table 5  
Panel B: TAXAVOID = GAAPETR3_ADJ 
Variables Size Qrt 1  Size Qrt 2  Size Qrt 3  Size Qrt 4 
             
STOCK -0.056**  -0.029**  -0.018  0.013 
 (-2.128)  (-2.153)  (-1.638)  (1.191) 
OPTIONS -0.058***  -0.029**  -0.021  0.063*** 
 (-2.839)  (-2.050)  (-1.486)  (4.552) 
LEV -0.017  -0.003  -0.038***  -0.013 
 (-1.030)  (-0.216)  (-3.344)  (-1.000) 
MTB 0.000  0.000  -0.000**  0.000 
 (1.506)  (1.386)  (-2.039)  (0.948) 
CAPINT 0.008  -0.023***  -0.016**  -0.015** 
 (1.128)  (-3.393)  (-2.561)  (-2.574) 
INV -0.003  -0.049**  -0.028  -0.026 
 (-0.104)  (-2.406)  (-1.361)  (-1.321) 
AD -0.077  0.104  0.085  -0.340*** 
 (-0.645)  (1.220)  (0.940)  (-3.058) 
RD -0.056***  -0.164***  -0.116**  -0.304*** 
 (-3.196)  (-6.309)  (-2.357)  (-5.433) 
PROA 0.004**  0.212***  0.172***  0.234*** 
 (2.506)  (13.103)  (8.620)  (9.107) 
INTAN -0.042***  -0.027**  -0.019*  -0.012 
 (-2.612)  (-2.007)  (-1.666)  (-1.271) 
EQINC 0.001  -0.113  -0.334***  -0.351*** 
 (0.010)  (-1.045)  (-3.882)  (-5.530) 
NOL -0.136***  -0.031***  0.002  0.006 
 (-13.681)  (-4.724)  (0.353)  (1.316) 
BIG4 -0.012  0.001  0.010  0.006 
 (-0.821)  (0.127)  (1.292)  (0.465) 
FORINCD -0.006  0.027***  0.035***  -0.001 
 (-0.587)  (4.499)  (5.925)  (-0.203) 
CASH -0.046**  -0.057***  -0.020  0.074*** 
 (-2.379)  (-3.133)  (-0.859)  (2.981) 
STCKEXP 0.051***  0.023***  0.009  -0.007 
 (4.404)  (3.174)  (1.076)  (-0.704) 
OPTBEN -2.513**  -1.742***  -1.328***  -0.217 
 (-2.179)  (-5.657)  (-5.335)  (-0.838) 
Constant 0.072***  0.060***  0.026**  0.003 
 (5.568)  (5.344)  (1.979)  (0.172) 
        
N   2,714 
 
 6,518 
 
 6,902 
 
 6,670 
 Yr. & Ind. FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.12  0.09  0.04  0.03 
This table presents results from estimating model (1) by size quartile, with quartile 1 being the 
smallest size, and quartile 4 being the largest. Panels A and B depict CASHETR3_ADJ and 
GAAPETR3_ADJ as the dependent variable, respectively. For each independent variable, 
estimated coefficients are presented in the top row and the two-sided t-statistics are in the bottom 
row. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. ***, **, and * indicate significance (two-tailed) 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Tax Avoidance and CEO/CFO Equity Compensation Incentives by Size Quartile 
 
Panel A: TAXAVOID = CASHETR3_ADJ 
Variables Size Qrt 1  Size Qrt 2  Size Qrt 3  Size Qrt 4 
             
EQUITY -0.040**  -0.013  0.005  0.031** 
 (-2.222)  (-0.889)  (0.408)  (2.391) 
EQUITY_CFO 0.002  0.005  0.004  0.013 
 (0.292)  (0.277)  (0.289)  (1.428) 
LEV -0.001  0.005  -0.067***  -0.085*** 
 (-0.054)  (0.318)  (-5.412)  (-5.715) 
MTB 0.000  -0.000  -0.001**  -0.000 
 (0.069)  (-1.352)  (-2.517)  (-1.143) 
CAPINT 0.013*  -0.016**  -0.013**  -0.028*** 
 (1.725)  (-2.185)  (-2.007)  (-4.368) 
INV 0.058**  -0.016  -0.036*  -0.039* 
 (2.362)  (-0.738)  (-1.659)  (-1.703) 
AD -0.024  0.023  0.211**  -0.319** 
 (-0.205)  (0.273)  (2.170)  (-2.322) 
RD -0.066***  -0.170***  -0.233***  -0.168*** 
 (-3.757)  (-5.917)  (-4.261)  (-2.620) 
PROA 0.001  0.170***  0.057***  0.005 
 (0.668)  (10.056)  (2.776)  (0.173) 
INTAN 0.034**  0.026*  0.021*  0.030*** 
 (2.129)  (1.889)  (1.684)  (2.809) 
EQINC 0.074  -0.183  -0.074  -0.044 
 (0.566)  (-1.538)  (-0.807)  (-0.600) 
NOL -0.166***  -0.067***  -0.032***  -0.013** 
 (-16.473)  (-9.842)  (-5.341)  (-2.341) 
BIG4 0.010  0.004  0.015*  -0.018 
 (0.655)  (0.672)  (1.895)  (-1.217) 
FORINCD 0.008  0.034***  0.056***  0.017*** 
 (0.782)  (5.524)  (8.984)  (2.614) 
CASH 0.051***  0.001  0.022  -0.060** 
 (2.636)  (0.034)  (0.895)  (-2.141) 
STCKEXP 0.056***  0.030***  0.015*  -0.021** 
 (4.874)  (4.060)  (1.869)  (-1.983) 
OPTBEN -5.320***  -1.219***  -0.675**  -0.235 
 (-4.746)  (-3.805)  (-2.576)  (-0.785) 
Constant 0.041***  0.048***  0.025*  0.088*** 
 (3.178)  (4.057)  (1.820)  (4.733) 
        
N   1,804 
 
 4,814 
 
 5,223 
 
 4,867 
 Yr. & Ind. FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.20  0.10  0.05  0.02 
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Table 6  
Panel B: TAXAVOID = GAAPETR3_ADJ 
Variables Size Qrt 1  Size Qrt 2  Size Qrt 3  Size Qrt 4 
             
EQUITY -0.076***  -0.012  -0.034**  0.017 
 (-3.406)  (-0.757)  (-2.291)  (1.265) 
EQUITY_CFO 0.000  -0.023  0.019  0.009 
 (0.045)  (-1.264)  (1.195)  (0.950) 
LEV -0.004  -0.023  -0.034**  -0.008 
 (-0.199)  (-1.383)  (-2.541)  (-0.493) 
MTB 0.000  0.000  -0.000*  0.000 
 (0.482)  (1.109)  (-1.829)  (1.541) 
CAPINT 0.014  -0.022***  -0.021***  -0.019*** 
 (1.526)  (-2.684)  (-2.924)  (-2.847) 
INV -0.044  -0.054**  -0.038  -0.032 
 (-1.465)  (-2.191)  (-1.611)  (-1.338) 
AD -0.059  0.056  0.076  -0.302** 
 (-0.410)  (0.576)  (0.710)  (-2.113) 
RD -0.071***  -0.193***  -0.150**  -0.307*** 
 (-3.247)  (-5.950)  (-2.499)  (-4.588) 
PROA 0.003*  0.223***  0.150***  0.200*** 
 (1.844)  (11.717)  (6.658)  (6.509) 
INTAN -0.031  -0.029*  -0.018  -0.025** 
 (-1.564)  (-1.846)  (-1.336)  (-2.258) 
EQINC 0.002  -0.028  -0.297***  -0.278*** 
 (0.012)  (-0.206)  (-2.959)  (-3.676) 
NOL -0.132***  -0.023***  0.004  0.008 
 (-10.625)  (-2.946)  (0.598)  (1.364) 
BIG4 -0.024  0.009  0.003  0.010 
 (-1.291)  (1.302)  (0.296)  (0.652) 
FORINCD -0.019  0.034***  0.035***  -0.006 
 (-1.420)  (4.845)  (5.184)  (-0.911) 
CASH -0.033  -0.051**  -0.005  0.071** 
 (-1.372)  (-2.437)  (-0.174)  (2.442) 
STCKEXP 0.052***  0.027***  0.009  -0.007 
 (3.632)  (3.304)  (0.972)  (-0.612) 
OPTBEN -3.490**  -1.576***  -1.426***  -0.463 
 (-2.522)  (-4.360)  (-4.977)  (-1.482) 
Constant 0.080***  0.052***  0.034**  0.011 
 (4.965)  (3.959)  (2.224)  (0.568) 
        
N   1,804 
 
 4,814 
 
 5,223 
 
 4,867 
 Yr. & Ind. FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.12  0.09  0.03  0.02 
This table presents results from estimating model (1) by size quartile, with quartile 1 being the 
smallest size, and quartile 4 being the largest. Panels A and B depict CASHETR3_ADJ and 
GAAPETR3_ADJ as the dependent variable, respectively. For each independent variable, 
estimated coefficients are presented in the top row and the two-sided t-statistics are in the bottom 
row. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. ***, **, and * indicate significance (two-tailed) 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Tax Avoidance and Equity Compensation Incentives by Size Quartile  
Panel A: TAXAVOID = CASHETR3_ADJ 
Variables Size Qrt 1  Size Qrt 2  Size Qrt 3  Size Qrt 4 
             
EQUITY -0.045**  -0.026*  0.021*  0.003 
 (-2.237)  (-1.844)  (1.685)  (0.189) 
EQUITY_TOP 0.014*  -0.007***  -0.001  -0.003* 
 (1.903)  (-3.067)  (-0.817)  (-1.939) 
LEV 0.007  -0.016  -0.068***  -0.119*** 
 (0.333)  (-0.925)  (-4.701)  (-6.220) 
MTB 0.000  -0.000  -0.001**  -0.000 
 (0.123)  (-1.077)  (-2.331)  (-1.492) 
CAPINT 0.009  -0.033***  -0.020**  -0.016** 
 (1.034)  (-3.803)  (-2.564)  (-2.086) 
INV 0.112***  -0.055**  0.016  -0.047* 
 (4.161)  (-2.182)  (0.645)  (-1.878) 
AD 0.060  0.350***  0.083  -0.278* 
 (0.447)  (3.070)  (0.689)  (-1.775) 
RD -0.077***  -0.120***  -0.190***  -0.162* 
 (-3.662)  (-3.217)  (-3.187)  (-1.865) 
PROA 0.001  0.166***  0.098***  0.035 
 (0.506)  (7.159)  (3.476)  (0.864) 
INTAN 0.015  0.022  0.042***  0.064*** 
 (0.750)  (1.237)  (2.903)  (4.917) 
EQINC 0.123  -0.167  -0.113  -0.024 
 (0.790)  (-1.155)  (-1.186)  (-0.292) 
NOL -0.173***  -0.050***  -0.029***  -0.021*** 
 (-16.250)  (-6.099)  (-4.068)  (-3.009) 
BIG4 0.030*  -0.000  0.009  -0.009 
 (1.785)  (-0.055)  (0.970)  (-0.493) 
FORINCD 0.027**  0.050***  0.039***  0.026*** 
 (2.355)  (6.487)  (5.372)  (3.192) 
CASH 0.025  -0.034  0.023  -0.037 
 (1.081)  (-1.417)  (0.803)  (-1.091) 
STCKEXP 0.051***  0.044***  0.010  -0.024* 
 (3.954)  (4.587)  (1.020)  (-1.867) 
OPTBEN -3.300***  -1.004**  -0.696**  -1.008*** 
 (-2.637)  (-2.520)  (-2.098)  (-2.615) 
Constant 0.048***  0.076***  0.023  0.083*** 
 (3.319)  (5.216)  (1.452)  (3.780) 
        
N   1,405  3,224 
 
 3,264 
 
 2,801 
 Yr. & Ind. FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.23  0.09  0.05  0.04 
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Table 7 
Panel B: TAXAVOID = GAAPETR3_ADJ 
Variables Size Qrt 1  Size Qrt 2  Size Qrt 3  Size Qrt 4 
             
EQUITY -0.051**  -0.022  -0.013  0.011 
 (-2.065)  (-1.426)  (-0.896)  (0.743) 
EQUITY_TOP 0.018**  -0.004*  0.001  -0.001 
 (2.107)  (-1.885)  (0.608)  (-0.637) 
LEV -0.027  -0.001  -0.042***  -0.071*** 
 (-1.097)  (-0.041)  (-2.587)  (-3.418) 
MTB -0.000  0.000  -0.001***  0.000 
 (-0.538)  (0.411)  (-3.065)  (1.111) 
CAPINT -0.017*  -0.017*  -0.025***  0.001 
 (-1.714)  (-1.849)  (-2.837)  (0.121) 
INV -0.002  -0.024  -0.044  -0.036 
 (-0.061)  (-0.876)  (-1.540)  (-1.326) 
AD -0.034  0.374***  0.143  -0.444*** 
 (-0.204)  (3.083)  (1.058)  (-2.597) 
RD -0.033  -0.151***  -0.088  -0.334*** 
 (-1.289)  (-3.811)  (-1.319)  (-3.519) 
PROA 0.006***  0.257***  0.199***  0.274*** 
 (2.677)  (10.422)  (6.269)  (6.289) 
INTAN -0.065***  -0.005  -0.040**  -0.012 
 (-2.632)  (-0.265)  (-2.410)  (-0.820) 
EQINC 0.390**  0.245  -0.320***  -0.237*** 
 (2.048)  (1.591)  (-2.988)  (-2.686) 
NOL -0.118***  -0.015*  0.006  0.001 
 (-9.016)  (-1.759)  (0.767)  (0.183) 
BIG4 -0.018  -0.012  -0.004  0.025 
 (-0.887)  (-1.502)  (-0.367)  (1.281) 
FORINCD -0.005  0.051***  0.028***  0.026*** 
 (-0.356)  (6.205)  (3.380)  (2.877) 
CASH -0.102***  -0.021  -0.030  0.093** 
 (-3.602)  (-0.839)  (-0.926)  (2.515) 
STCKEXP 0.044***  0.038***  -0.003  -0.009 
 (2.801)  (3.771)  (-0.280)  (-0.628) 
OPTBEN -2.405  -1.849***  -1.418***  -0.363 
 (-1.567)  (-4.359)  (-3.804)  (-0.863) 
Constant 0.092***  0.026*  0.045**  -0.024 
 (5.215)  (1.668)  (2.561)  (-1.014) 
        
N   1,405 
 
 3,224 
 
 3,264 
 
 2,801 
 Yr. & Ind. FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.12  0.10  0.04  0.04 
This table presents results from estimating model (1) by size quartile, with quartile 1 being the 
smallest size, and quartile 4 being the largest. Panels A and B depict CASHETR3_ADJ and 
GAAPETR3_ADJ as the dependent variable, respectively. For each independent variable, 
estimated coefficients are presented in the top row and the two-sided t-statistics are in the bottom 
row. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. ***, **, and * indicate significance (two-tailed) 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 8 
Tax Avoidance and CEO Equity Compensation Incentives by Size Quartile 
 
Panel A: TAXAVOID = UTBENDS 
Variables Size Qrt 1  Size Qrt 2  Size Qrt 3  Size Qrt 4 
             
EQUITY 0.292***  0.164***  0.161***  -0.015 
 (5.160)  (3.352)  (3.577)  (-0.283) 
LEV -0.047  0.097  -0.069  0.001 
 (-0.851)  (1.538)  (-1.347)  (0.018) 
MTB 0.000  -0.001  -0.003***  -0.002* 
 (0.151)  (-1.547)  (-2.615)  (-1.867) 
CAPINT -0.002  -0.094***  -0.055**  -0.107*** 
 (-0.097)  (-3.194)  (-2.021)  (-3.632) 
INV 0.078  0.228**  -0.118  0.203* 
 (0.956)  (2.525)  (-1.276)  (1.953) 
AD -0.088  -0.215  0.252  2.724*** 
 (-0.224)  (-0.569)  (0.605)  (4.568) 
RD 0.283***  1.329***  2.633***  4.694*** 
 (4.944)  (11.469)  (11.890)  (14.003) 
PROA 0.010**  0.163**  -0.261***  0.206 
 (2.067)  (2.173)  (-2.793)  (1.450) 
INTAN -0.112**  -0.320***  -0.052  -0.014 
 (-2.150)  (-5.220)  (-0.992)  (-0.290) 
EQINC -0.521  -0.950**  -1.022***  -0.400 
 (-1.130)  (-2.056)  (-2.824)  (-1.231) 
NOL 0.122***  0.162***  0.135***  -0.047* 
 (3.685)  (5.477)  (5.329)  (-1.825) 
BIG4 0.276***  0.111***  0.174***  0.204*** 
 (5.701)  (4.066)  (4.989)  (2.903) 
FORINCD 0.245***  0.362***  0.228***  0.275*** 
 (7.074)  (13.183)  (8.649)  (8.967) 
CASH 0.063  0.181**  0.697***  1.192*** 
 (0.971)  (2.163)  (6.727)  (9.165) 
STCKEXP 0.058  0.002  0.007  0.052 
 (1.483)  (0.049)  (0.216)  (1.085) 
OPTBEN -3.871  2.456*  -0.802  9.618*** 
 (-0.902)  (1.712)  (-0.705)  (6.928) 
Constant -0.071*  0.024  0.018  0.174** 
 (-1.654)  (0.463)  (0.304)  (2.034) 
        
N   2,168  4,814 
 
 5,103 
 
 5,013 
 Yr. & Ind. FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.09  0.14  0.15  0.16 
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Table 8 
 
Panel B: TAXAVOID = UTBADDS 
Variables Size Qrt 1  Size Qrt 2  Size Qrt 3  Size Qrt 4 
             
EQUITY 0.047***  0.027**  0.034***  -0.002 
 (3.812)  (2.287)  (3.221)  (-0.193) 
LEV -0.015  0.005  -0.030**  -0.022 
 (-1.229)  (0.348)  (-2.486)  (-1.403) 
MTB -0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
 (-0.419)  (0.170)  (-0.773)  (-0.359) 
CAPINT 0.006  -0.006  -0.006  -0.007 
 (1.136)  (-0.795)  (-0.978)  (-1.008) 
INV 0.024  0.044**  0.009  0.017 
 (1.329)  (2.019)  (0.399)  (0.699) 
AD -0.025  0.082  0.161*  0.770*** 
 (-0.290)  (0.899)  (1.656)  (5.530) 
RD 0.072***  0.530***  0.696***  1.266*** 
 (5.798)  (18.906)  (13.466)  (16.184) 
PROA 0.002  0.015  -0.016  0.118*** 
 (1.565)  (0.827)  (-0.743)  (3.539) 
INTAN -0.016  -0.027*  0.027**  0.041*** 
 (-1.420)  (-1.835)  (2.208)  (3.568) 
EQINC -0.048  -0.053  -0.077  0.011 
 (-0.477)  (-0.473)  (-0.907)  (0.146) 
NOL 0.013*  0.003  0.014**  -0.013** 
 (1.781)  (0.401)  (2.380)  (-2.170) 
BIG4 0.044***  0.023***  0.019**  0.032** 
 (4.179)  (3.540)  (2.295)  (1.962) 
FORINCD 0.036***  0.055***  0.027***  0.019*** 
 (4.830)  (8.301)  (4.406)  (2.720) 
CASH 0.018  0.047**  0.208***  0.319*** 
 (1.302)  (2.299)  (8.609)  (10.503) 
STCKEXP 0.008  -0.011  -0.021***  -0.000 
 (0.982)  (-1.361)  (-2.679)  (-0.027) 
OPTBEN 0.960  -0.321  -0.609**  1.482*** 
 (1.027)  (-0.923)  (-2.295)  (4.574) 
Constant -0.018*  -0.021*  -0.022  0.002 
 (-1.914)  (-1.716)  (-1.613)  (0.095) 
        
N   2,168  4,814 
 
 5,103 
 
 5,013 
 Yr. & Ind. FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.06  0.16  0.15  0.17 
This table presents results from estimating model (1) by size quartile, with quartile 1 being the 
smallest size, and quartile 4 being the largest. Panels A and B depict UTBENDS and UTBADDS 
as the dependent variable, respectively. For each independent variable, estimated coefficients are 
presented in the top row and the two-sided t-statistics are in the bottom row. Refer to Appendix A 
for variable definitions. ***, **, and * indicate significance (two-tailed) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
